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Filtering, Piracy Surveillance and Disobedience
Sonia K. Katyal*
On January 6, 2009, Apple made a surprising announcement: it declared that it
had decided to remove anti-copying restrictions from all of the songs in its iTunes
store, and also to forego charging a single price for each song. Instead, Apple
would price some songs at 69 cents (rather than the standard 99 cents), and others
slightly higher, depending upon their popularity.'
Almost immediately, the
decision caused a firestorm of commentary on the potential effects of Apple's
decision on the future of the market for music, piracy and content distribution. "I
think the writing was on the wall, both for Apple and the labels, that basically
consumers were not going to put up with D.R.M. [digital rights management]
anymore," one consumer analyst explained to the New York Times. 2 Music
industry insiders applauded the decision, predicting that it would help lift the
sagging market for music by enabling more creative strategies to serve a consumer
3
base that increasingly favored more interoperability with digital forms of content.
The decision was a culmination of Apple's longstanding position, advanced over
a couple of years, that was markedly critical of DRM. In February of 2007, Apple
CEO Steve Jobs wrote an open letter to the public criticizing DRM for its rigorous
limitations on consumers. "Imagine a world where every online store sells DRMfree music encoded in open licensable formats," Jobs wrote. "In such a world, any
player can play music purchased from any store, and any store can sell music which
is playable on all players. This is clearly the best alternative for consumers, and
Apple would embrace it in a heartbeat," he promised, so long as the big four music
companies would license their music to Apple without the requirement that it be
DRM-protected. 4 The letter prompted one recording company, EMI, to reach a
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1. See Brad Stone, Want to Copy iTunes Music? Go Ahead, Apple Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
2009, at B 1.
2. See id.
3. Id.
4. See Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music, Feb. 6, 2007, http://www.apple.com/hotnews/
thoughtsonmusic/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
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deal that offered DRM-free music on iTunes, but other recording companies
5
remained recalcitrant until they finally agreed to Apple's request two years later.
There is, however, an important and overlooked footnote to Apple's muchheralded decision. More than a year and a half before Apple's groundbreaking
decision, a web site, Ars Technica, announced an important discovery: every
consumer's identifying information, including the user's full name and email
address, came embedded on each song that was purportedly DRM-free. 6 In fact,
Apple embedded account information on every song purchased by a consumer.
"Previously," the Ars Technica journalist explained, "it wasn't much of a big deal,
since no one could imagine users sharing encrypted, DRMed content. But now that
DRM-free music from Apple is on the loose, the hidden data is more significant
since it could theoretically be used to trace shared tunes back to the original
owner," raising implications for both privacy and, of course, piracy as well.7
This outcome, in many ways, highlights a unique shift in approaches to
copyright enforcement. While civil liberties advocates previously warned about the
aggressive nature of copyright protection initiatives, like litigation, we have also
watched a number of major players in the music industry eventually cede to less
direct forms of control over consumer behavior. In fact, just a few months before
Apple's announcement, the recording industry offered a major concession of its
own when it announced that it had opted to end its infamous lawsuit campaign
against end users. Instead of filing suit, the industry announced that it would
simply notify the Internet Service Provider, or ISP, if the RIAA detects
infringement. The ISP, in turn, will notify the user, and if the infringement
continues, terminate the user's access in lieu of a lawsuit. 8
Notice, however, that while the RIAA's litigation campaign has waned, it still
fully intends to rely on active surveillance and monitoring of the web to detect
infringement. Thus, as more aggressive forms of consumer control, like litigation,
have receded, we have also seen a rise in more passive forms of consumer
surveillance, such as Apple's embedding of consumer information. Moreover, at
the same time that DRM technologies have taken a slightly less prominent role in
governing consumers, filtering has radically escalated, raising slightly different
issues about the risks of error and preservation of fair use protections in a digital
context.
Given this background, the importance of Apple's decision could not be
overstated among those who had long expressed concern about the balance that had
been struck between the protection of intellectual property and the preservation of
civil liberties. Apple's DRM-free music, while a major win for consumer
autonomy in enjoying content, also, to some extent carries implications for the

5. Stone, supra note 1.
6. See Ken Fisher, Apple Hides Account Info in DRM-Free Music, Too, May 30, 2007,
http://arstechnica.com/apple/news/2007/05/apple-hides-account-info-in-drm-free-music-too.ars
(last
visited Feb. 20, 2009).
7. See id.
8. Sarah McBride and Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec.
19, 2008, at BI.
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user's informational privacy. Why would Apple try to collect such information, the
Ars Technica report asked? The article opined that the information might be useful
for Apple to collect in aggregate, perhaps in order to detect possible examples of
what the entertainment industry has termed "casual piracy," or the occasional
content shared between friends. 9 While consumers might seem free to copy music
onto their personal networks and devices, the unrelenting shadow of consumer
monitoring and surveillance ensures that recordkeeping quietly continues to protect
against piracy.
One Wired blogger summarized the relationship between the recording industry
and Apple perfectly when he opined, "They may have thought they couldn't live
together, but they certainly couldn't thrive apart."' 0 The same observation,
ironically, is equally true of the relationship between copyright protection and civil
liberties. The Apple decision, therefore, gives rise to a variety of opportunities for
reflection by scholars and copyright enthusiasts. While the music industry has been
known to offer the public a broad definition of illegal piracy, Apple's decision to
offer DRM-free music suggests a sort of private decriminalization of unauthorized
activity (albeit with recordkeeping methods in tow). Further, even as technology
has developed more perfect means for filtering and surveillance over online piracy,
a number of major players have opted in favor of "tolerated uses," a term coined by
Professor Tim Wu to denote the allowance of uses that may be otherwise
infringing, but that are allowed to exist for public use and enjoyment." Thus,
while the eventual specter of copyright enforcement and monitoring remains a
pervasive digital reality, the market may fuel a broad degree of consumer freedom
through the toleration or taxation of certain kinds of activities.
This Article is meant largely to address and to evaluate these shifts by drawing
attention to the unique confluence of two important moments: the growth of
tolerated uses, coupled with an increasing trend towards more passive forms of
piracy surveillance in light of the balance between copyright enforcement and civil
liberties. The content industries may draw upon a broad definition of disobedience
in their campaigns to educate the public about copyright law, but the market's
allowance of DRM-free content suggests an altogether different definition. The
divide in turn between copyright enforcement and civil liberties results in a perfect
storm of uncertainty, suggesting the development of an even further division
between the role of the law and the role of the marketplace in copyright
enforcement and innovation, respectively.
I. NETWORKS OF DETECTION
Intellectual property frameworks play two conflicting roles in digital space; at
the same time that these frameworks govern the various content-music, pictures,
film, software, web sites-that individuals utilize and access on the Web, these
9. See Fisher, supra note 6.
10. See Posting of Eliot Van Buskirk to Epicenter, http://blog.wired.com/business/ (Jan. 6, 2009,
15:41 EST).
11.
Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM J.L. & ARTS 617 (2008).
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same frameworks also govern the creation, assembly and collection of consumer
information through techniques of data mining and surveillance. For this reason,
any specter of copyright enforcement always raises the risk of constant tradeoffs
being made between intellectual property protection and consumer expectations in
privacy and freedom of expression online. As the result of the DMCA, the conflict
between intellectual property and civil liberties becomes focused almost entirely on
the role of intermediaries, and the ideal role they should play in protecting the
balance between the two interests. As Rebecca Tushnet has insightfully observed,
the DMCA's regulation of intermediaries shows that it is possible to shape the
contours of the marketplace of speech even without an intention to do so directly. 12
Ten years ago, Congress unwittingly crafted the first real framework for piracy
surveillance when it confronted the proliferation of online content and the need for
the law to respond to the dangers of massive online infringement and unrestrained
defamation. As many scholars have analyzed at great length, the perceived
anonymity of cyberspace initially encouraged private citizens to adopt certain
identities, engage in particular expressions and undertake certain activities they
would probably never think to adopt in real space. 13 While the perceived
anonymity of cyberspace seemed filled with endless possibilities of human
expression, it also offered a tantalizing cloak for individuals who chose to engage
in the online sharing and trading of content without authorization. One scholar
deemed the internet a "Temporary Autonomous Zone," or TAZ, suggesting that
online content was free for the taking, having been freed from the constraints of
copyright regulation in the real world. 14
These two developments-the increasing prominence of an electronic persona,
coupled with an explosion of content-may seem distinguishable, but they are
intimately related, and both developments increasingly focus on the role of the ISP
in negotiating these trajectories. While the growth of the internet led to an
immense explosion of content-music, computer software, and other media-it
also spawned a number of difficult challenges regarding the protection of
copyrighted works from unauthorized distribution. Put another way, the internet
created a broadcast media that is permeated with potential for creativity and
communication, but it also provided the mechanism for massive infringement.
The answer to these challenges, it seemed, was to focus primarily on
reconfiguring the role of the intermediary in enforcing copyright protections. As
Professor Edward Lee has eloquently explained, the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA) is composed of two principal, and potentially conflicting, elements:
Title I, which expanded the scope of copyright protection by establishing
protections against the circumvention of DRM restrictions; and Title II, which
contracted the scope of copyright by establishing a set of safe harbors for Internet

12. See Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 986, 1004 (2008).
13.

See SH-ERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN (1995).

14. See Hakim Bey, The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism,
at http://www.hermetic.com/bey/tazcont.html (last visited June 25, 2009).
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Service Providers (ISPs) to protect them from monetary liability. 15
Title II represented an uncertain balance between preserving innovation and
protecting against digital copyright infringement. To protect both dimensions, the
DMCA distinguished between actions either directly (or indirectly) required of a
copyright owner from those required of an Internet Service Provider. In choosing
to implement Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Congress rejected
the option of imposing an absolute standard of liability for Internet Service
Providers. Instead, Congress' answer to these tensions lay in a finely crafted
compromise, known as a "notice and takedown" system, which required copyright
holders to search the web to identify instances of infringement, and then, after
undertaking an identification process, to request that the ISP "take down" the
offending content. Under these provisions, an ISP is required either to identify the
subscriber and/or to take down the posting as long as the copyright owner makes an
assertion of a "good faith" belief that infringement has occurred.16 In order for the
Internet Service Provider to take advantage of the safe harbor provided in DMCA
legislation, the ISP is required to act expeditiously in doing so.
It is important to note, however, that the DMCA did not place an obligation on
the part of the ISP to actually detect instances of infringement on its own. Instead,
under the DMCA, the responsibility for such a task fell largely to copyright owners,
indirectly authorizing them to perform the arduous, though at times necessary, task
of trolling and investigating web sites, peer-to-peer and other forms of plural
networks to detect potential examples of infringement.' 7 As a result, creators of
intellectual property drew upon traditional methods of consumer surveillancecollecting information, surreptitious monitoring, recording one's online activitiesto detect instances of piracy, employing the ISP as an intermediary in their efforts.
In the past, I have defined "piracy surveillance" to encompass particular types of
monitoring that: (1) are performed by private, non-government entities; (2)
encompass extra-judicial determinations of copyright infringement and (3) are
extra-legal18 in nature; that is, surveillance that takes place outside of ongoing
litigation.
Each of these activities has grown in the past few years, spawning a small
cottage industry of anti-piracy enforcement technologies. For example, Audible
Magic-the favored tool of MySpace.com and others, including over seventy-five
universities-operates by scanning online for copyrighted material and then
checking against a massive database of audio and video content that has been
provided by the recording industry, and movie and television studios.i 9 Other
companies offering piracy surveillance services include Gracenote, advestigo,
15. See Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233 (2009).
16. See Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 222, 273 (2004-2005)
(explaining provisions).
17. For more discussion of the techniques relied upon by intellectual property owners, see Part II;
Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 297 (2003); Katyal, supra notel6.
18. Katyal, supranote 16, at 292.
19. See Michael Liedtke, Audible Magic Emerging as Top Copyright Cop in Digital Revolution,
USA TODAY, Mar. 23, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techinnovations/2007-03-23-magicpoliceN.htm.
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Auditude, Vobile, and Attributor, enabling copyright owners to "scan the entire
Internet to uncover the unauthorized use of the material. ' 20 All of these strategies
place the responsibility for infringement detection squarely upon the copyright
owner. As an executive from the Internet Service Provider community explained:
We believe that the task of ferreting out copyright infringement on the Internet should
fall to the copyright owner. Today, copyright owners have access to a large array of
Internet search engines and "spiders" to sniff out material they know belongs to them
(unlike the ISPs, who cannot be certain who may have recently purchased which
copyrighted material.) Once the copyright owners discover infringement, they can
21
bring it to the attention of the ISPs. It is at this point that the ISPs can sensibly act.
As a result of the DMCA, intellectual property owners have undertaken a
program of monitoring for piracy, and ISPs have developed a response system that
acts to "take down" allegedly infringing material in order to avoid allegations of
22
contributory liability as a result.
Although piracy surveillance was borne out of this compromise between
copyright owners and ISPs, its function and operation in cyberspace masks several
powerful unintended consequences. The most glaring of these ironies, for our
purposes, lies in a key ambivalence regarding the proper role of ISPs.
Intermediaries like ISPs play a key role in enforcing copyright law for two reasons.
First, they serve as the conduit by which the intellectual property owner identifies
the subscriber, and second, under the DMCA, they are forced either to take down
the infringing material or to terminate internet access to the subscriber. Thus, they
are often the only barriers between ordinary citizens and the surveillance measures
used by content owners to identify them. As a result, ISPs are often caught
between two conflicting motivations: the need to protect others' intellectual
property to avoid liability and the need to protect their consumers' privacy and fair
23
use in uncertain cases.
These conflicting motivations often impose a much more malleable and
ambiguous set of responsibilities on the part of the ISP. The DMCA expressly
lacks an affirmative requirement for ISPs to monitor their systems or to seek facts
that indicate infringing activity, ostensibly since copyright owners are expected to
fulfill this responsibility.2 4 In fact, as Professor Lee explains in his article,
Congress "sought to avoid creating perverse incentives that would turn ISPs into
effective censors of material, indiscriminately removing vast amounts of content to
20.
21.

Liedtke, supra note 19, at 1.
See WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act; and Online Copyright Liability Limitation

Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Propertyof

the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 89 (1997) (statement of Roy Neel, President, United States
Telephone Association).
22.

See Katyal, supra note 16, at 278.

23. See id. at 276.
24. See Lee, supra note 15 at 254. Pursuant to § 512(m), the DMCA safe harbor protections are
not conditional upon a service provider "monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating
infringing activity." 17 U.S.C. §512(m)(1), cited in Brian Yeh, Safe Harborfor Service ProvidersUnder
the DigitalMillennium Copyright Act, available at: ipmall.info/hostedresources/crs/RL32037_030815.
pdf at 8.
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avoid liability .... 25 Nor, it seems, did Congress want to require ISPs to make
26
difficult decisions regarding whether an activity counts as infringement or not.
Instead, the wording of the DMCA requires that an ISP remove potentially
infringing material if the ISP has "actual knowledge" of the infringing material, or
if it is "aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent,"
and the knowledge standard tends to utilize a comparably much higher standard of
proof to satisfy the "awareness" prong. 27 While the Senate Judiciary Committee
suggests the need to judge "aware[ness]" from both a subjective and objective
perspective, in which it explores both the actual state of mind of the ISP as well as
"whether infringing activity would have been apparent to a reasonable person," this
malleable standard often offers little concrete guidance for an ISP in evaluating its
own policies and procedures. 28 The law suggests that the ISP is required to act
expeditiously, but it does not provide any guidance for the ISP in addressing the
merits of the accusation, suggesting, perhaps indirectly, that the ISP is required to
simply defer to the copyright owner's overall determination instead.
The legislative history that Lee relies upon suggests that for infringing activity
to be "apparent," it must be "obviously" or "clearly" infringing, such as a "pirate"
site "where sound recordings, software, movies, or books were available for
unauthorized downloading, public performance, or public display." 29 In such
cases, the Senate reports direct that most sites actively rely upon words like
"pirate" or "bootleg" in their titles, enabling an observer to note the illegal nature of
their activities "from even a brief and casual viewing." 30 As Lee explains,
Congress may have required such a high standard because it did not want to saddle
ISPs with the difficult task of trying to make complex copyright determinations,
given the myriad grey areas of legality in defining illegal activity. Cases such as
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC tend to bolster this view. 31 In Perfect 10, the Ninth
Circuit held that the use of domain names like "illegal.net" and
"stolencelebritypics.com" did not provide the requisite evidence of outright
illegality, because the use of the terms might suggest "an attempt to increase their
rather than an admission that the photographs are actually illegal
salacious appeal,
32
stolen."
or
Yet while the law clearly weighs against requiring affirmative searches for
infringement, and in favor of a high degree of awareness of illegality for liability to
attach to an ISP, common law appears to be moving in a direction that suggests an
increasing obligation on the part of ISPs to monitor the activities of their
25. See Lee, supra note 15, at 254.
26. See id. (citing both Senate and House reports).
27. See id. at 234 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1) and 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (2000)) (emphasis
added).
28. See id. at 235 (quoting S. REP. 105-190, at 44).
29. See id. at 255-256 (quoting S. REP. 105-90, at 48-49).
30. See id. at 256 (quoting S. REP. 105-90, at 48-49).
31. 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007).
32. Id at 1114. In another case elaborating on this standard, the ISP had to be able to tell, just
from looking at the user's activities, that the conduct constituted copyright infringement. See Corbis
Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 2d. 1090, 1104-05 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
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subscribers through the use of filters in order to avoid secondary liability. Here, the
law's growing emphasis on filters contravenes, at least somewhat, the DMCA's
language, which directly states that "websites have no affirmative duty to monitor
their services or to "affirmatively seek[] facts indicating infringing activity." 33 As
a result, the law sets forth a strained position for ISPs: even though ISPs are not
required to "affirmatively" seek out information of infringement, the law has
directed that an ISP who remains aware of infringement and fails to act risks
liability.
The resulting inconsistency between the DMCA that expressly does not require
affirmative monitoring of its users, and a common law trend that tends to indirectly
expand the boundaries of secondary liability for ISPs often means that the law
incentivizes risk averse content distributors to adopt preventative measures, i.e.
filtering, in order to detect infringement before content is posted.34 Filtering, like
other ex ante methods of preventing copyright infringement, when coupled with the
existing DMCA notice-and-takedown process, tend to redefine, and potentially
expand, the responsibilities of Internet Service Providers, despite the DMCA's
statutory assurances that presumably insulate ISPs from affirmatively searching for
evidence of infringement.
Though Section 512 aims to split the burden of copyright enforcement between
the copyright owner and the ISP, a chorus of case law has emerged that suggests
that the boundaries of ISP responsibility are far broader than the DMCA standards
suggest, requiring ISPs to undertake preventative precautions, like filtering, to deter
infringement. Consider the Supreme Court's opinion in Grokster, for example,
which tended to utilize a malleable standard of liability that leans towards
increasing responsibility for the ISP. 35 The opinion set forth the requirement that a
computer system operator possess "actual knowledge that specific infringing
material" is on its system, and fail to undertake "simple measures" to remove the
material.3 6 At the same time, however, the Court found that the absence of filters
was a significant part of its finding of contributory liability. The court found
evidence of the defendants' unlawful intent because "neither company attempted to
develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity using
their software." Even though the Ninth Circuit treated the defendants' failure to
develop such tools as irrelevant because they lacked an independent duty to
monitor their users' activity, as per the wording of the DMCA, the Supreme Court
disagreed with the lower court, and stated instead that the evidence "underscores
' 37
Grokster's and StreamCast's intentional facilitation of their users' infringement."
In other words, by finding the absence of filtering to be significant to the
defendants' illegal inducement of infringement, the Court indirectly imposed an
expectation that filtering would become part of the design of content distribution as
33.
34.

17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (2000).
See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116

YALE L.J. 882 (2007).

35.
36.
37.

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1170-72 (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929-32).
Metro-Goldwyn-MayerStudios Inc., 545 U.S. at 939 (2005).

2009]

FILTERING, PIRACY SURVEILLANCE, AND DISOBEDIENCE

a result.
Grokster therefore places intermediaries on uncertain footing, perhaps in part
due to the polarity between these statutory and common law positions. The DMCA
expressly states that an affirmative search for infringement is not required, but the
Supreme Court's analysis in Grokster suggests that the absence of filters is a
relevant part of the contributory liability framework, leaving intermediaries lost in
the middle. While ISPs, left to their own devices, would probably opt against
affirmative searches of their clients' sites for evidence of infringement, Grokster's
inducement theory of liability, coupled with the Supreme Court's finding that the
absence of filtering was statutorily significant, tips the scale further toward
incentivizing ISPs to behave more like a copyright enforcer than the DMCA's
original compromise might have envisioned.
For an example of how this uncertain status of affairs affects ISPs, consider the
Aimster case, handed down a few years before Grokster.38 Unlike Napster and
Grokster, which enabled a relatively transparent exchange of copyrighted files,
Aimster encrypted files before circulating them.
Consequently, the court
concluded that "a service provider that would otherwise be a contributory infringer
does not obtain immunity by using encryption to shield itself from actual
39
knowledge of the unlawful purposes for which the service is being used."
Following Sony, the court observed that, "[b]y eliminating the encryption feature
and monitoring the use being made of its system, Aimster could have limited the
amount of infringement." 40 Given Aimster's failure to do so, the court concluded
that "its ostrich-like refusal to discover the extent to which its system was being
used to infringe copyright is merely another piece of evidence that it was a
contributory infringer." 41 Central to the court's determination was the need for a
cost/benefit showing that demonstrated "that it would have been disproportionately
costly for [the defendant] to eliminate or at least reduce substantially the infringing
uses." 4 2 This finding has been interpreted by some to suggest that the defendant
has to defend its design choices by showing that it would be prohibitively
expensive to redesign its software-further suggesting that developers
that opt
43
against designs that inhibit infringement risk secondary liability.
The consequence of this protracted trend towards filtering starts looking a great
deal more like an affirmative obligation from the point of view of an ISP. If the
"profit motivated failure to filter promotes an inference of intent to induce
infringement" under Grokster, then it may also be true, as Tim Wu has suggested,
that the presence of some filters establishes a kind of informal "safe harbor" from
contributory liability. 44 This amounts to, of course, the suggestion that a
38. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
39. Id. at 650-51.
40. Id. at 654-55.
41. Id. at 655.
42. Id. at 653.
43. See Rebecca Giblin, A Bit Liable? A Guide to Navigating the U.S. Secondary Liability
Patchwork,25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 7, 36 (2008-2009).
44. Jane C. Ginsburg, Separatingthe Sony Sheep from the Grokster Goats: Reckoning the Future
Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepreneurs,50 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 587 (citing
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technology developer that opts against installing a filter
(or a similar mechanism)
45
might risk facing secondary liability for infringement.
Yet by suggesting that the failure to filter might support a claim of contributory
liability, the Court left open the question of how much filtering is required, and
how reliable the filtering must be. How much filtering is enough? And should the
law require filtering, even at the expense of cabining valuable noninfringing uses?
Even in the aftermath of the case, the district court in Grokster conceded, on
remand, that perfect filtering was likely an impossible goal.46 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that the defendants must include a filter and encourage users to
upgrade to filtered software. 47 However, it was careful to note that "[p]laintiffs'
copyrights can be protected to the extent feasible, but Morpheus's noninfringing
uses will not be completely enjoined," and decided to appoint a special master for
the purpose of preserving the balance between utilizing a filtering regime to reduce
the software's infringing capacity
while preserving noninfringing functionality in
48
light of potential cost concerns.
As a result, the DMCA's assurances that initially insulated an ISP from the
responsibility of "affirmative monitoring" appear to have receded into the
background of common law findings that place a greater amount of responsibility
on the ISP. In the famous suit filed against YouTube, for example, Viacom alleged
that YouTube had "deliberately chosen not to take reasonable precautions to deter
the rampant infringement on its site," arguing that it was not possible for
"copyright owners to monitor YouTube on a daily or hourly basis to detect
infringing videos and send notices to YouTube demanding that it 'take down' the
infringing works." 49 The suggestion was that the responsibility to monitor should
lie with YouTube, not Viacom.
Note the irony of what Viacom observes: that it is simply not possible for
Viacom to monitor YouTube's content. But Viacom's observation suggests an
important shift in the framework that the DMCA authorizes-Viacom no longer
wants to carry the responsibility of determining infringement; instead it delegates
this responsibility to YouTube to take up the reins. But if Viacom is not in a
position to detect infringement, then who is? A copyright owner might opt for a
system that is overinclusive of examples of actionable infringement, whereas an
ISP might opt for a system that is underinclusive. The absence of a clear governing
standard forces us to contemplate the tremendously powerful effect of this state of

Tim Wu, The Copyright Paradox,2005 SUP. CT. REV. 229, 247).
45.

See Pamela Samuelson, Three Reactions to MGM v. Grokster, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH.

L. REV. 177, 192 (2006).
46. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1235 (C.D.Cal.
2007).
47. Seeid at 1236.
48. See id. at 1236-37.
49. Complaint at 3, Viacom Intern. Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No.
07 Civ. 2103). See also statement of Phillipe P. Dauman, President and CEO of Viacom, "[e]very day
we have to scour the entirety of what is available on YouTube, so we have to look for our stuff ...It is
very difficult for us and places an enormous burden on us." Miguel Helft, WhoseTube?: Viacom Sues
Google over Video Clips on its Sharing Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at C4.
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affairs on content dissemination models and innovation. When YouTube adopted
filters, for example, one commentator drily noted: "[Its] action today may have the
practical effect of changing filtering from 'one' factor'[sic] to 'the' factor that a
whether an innovator should be liable for the copyright
court considers in deciding
50
infringement of others."
II.

NETWORKS OF DISOBEDIENCE

The domains of piracy surveillance-filtering, monitoring, and the like--often
mask a crucial, and foundational ambiguity: it is sometimes hard to tell at the
outset whether user generated content is legal or not. At times, the decision to post
copyrighted material crosses a perfectly clear line between legal and illegal
conduct, making the "outlaw" moniker an appropriate one. In many cases,
however, the boundaries of intellectual property rights are frequently unclear,
leaving the legality of seemingly transgressive actions open to dispute. Consider
the widely-watched mashup video entitled "Brokeback to the Future," which
featured a variety of clips from the Back to the Future film series, set to the
background score of Brokeback Mountain, the blockbuster from 2006. The clips
were not actually digitally transformed, but they were remixed in a completely
unique and creative manner to suggest the presence of a love relationship between
Michael J. Fox and Christopher Lloyd's characters. Should the mashup count as
fair use? Would YouTube's filters detect them? And if so, how would YouTube
decide whether the content was legal or illegal? The answer might depend on how
broadly (or narrowly) one interprets the definition of "transformative."
If law professors disagree on the meaning of such a contested term, it becomes
even more likely that a copyright owner would generate a notice in even borderline
cases, and even more likely that a risk-averse ISP would respond immediately by
taking down the material in order to preserve its safe harbor status. Given the
potential for divergent opinions over what constitutes fair use, it is often difficult to
define what digital illegality comprises. Is it defiance of the law, or defiance of the
wishes of a copyright owner, or both? If the conduct is not clearly illegal, how can
it be considered copyright 'infringement' or 'piracy'?
Although copyright owners, particularly as they rely on the domain of piracy
surveillance to detect infringers, may label all such detected behavior as "illegal,"
and refer to their adversaries as outlaws or pirates, the murkiness of intellectual
property rights often makes it very difficult-in the absence of protracted
litigation-to determine conclusively that the behavior in question is actually
contrary to the law. Those who engage in intellectual property disobedience are
therefore often in a position to counter that their actions are perfectly lawful under,
for example, expansive conceptions of constitutional rights of free speech or of the
fair use doctrine. Alternatively, they might argue that the law may not yet have
developed a cohesive viewpoint on the activity. But at the outset, it is difficult to

50.

Gigi Sohn, Google Blinks, and Today the Internet is a Little Less Free, PUB. KNOWLEDGE,

Oct. 15, 2007, http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1217.
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say what a court will decide, and this suggests a greater degree of legal uncertainty
than in a typical case of tangible property disobedience, civil or otherwise.
As Joseph Liu aptly pointed out in an earlier symposium piece in this Journal,
the uncertainty that pervades copyright does not mean that there are not easy
cases. 51 But the uncertainty over what constitutes fair use, particularly in cases of
appropriation of content, often risks chilling the transformative work of artists who
seek to incorporate the work of others. 52 Even though unauthorized activity takes
place in both the physical property and intellectual property context, intellectual
property law, particularly copyright, has tended to tolerate a greater degree of legal
"grey" areas than have other types of property regulation. There are several
reasons for this. One stems from the formal dynamism and complexity typical of
intellectual property regulation. The type of property in question lacks the clear
legal boundaries typical of land parcels and other tangible properties. Another is
the murkiness of the extra-legal social and cultural norms that govern authorized
uses, particularly in the areas of copyright and trademark. Consider, for example,
the number of times individuals have copied, shared or distributed copyrighted
music without acquiring permission beforehand. Were these acts of sharing always
illegal? Many people never considered the possibility that these sorts of activities
might be illegal until technological advances made it possible, particularly in the
online context, for intellectual property owners to detect and punish them.
Throughout legal history, property principles historically developed through a
series of chaotically eloquent metaphors-the "bundle of sticks," for examplethat eventually came to be applied, through various parallels, to its milder cousin,
intellectual property. Yet while these parallels between land and literature are
useful in analyzing the limits and the possibilities behind the protection of
intellectual property, they have given us little guidance in analyzing the diverse
problems that are posed by the nature of cyberspace. 53 While property concepts
tend to focus on the stability of commodities, intellectual property involves
protecting an intangible, unstable and easily transferable good-a good that
attaches itself to evanescent ideas, characters, identities and inventions. Moreover,
unlike real property, intellectual property carries with it a host of inherent
limitations on both access and use--durational limits, fair use exceptions, licensing
restrictions-that often serve to complicate an intellectual property right by
simultaneously limiting and strengthening it at different points, depending on the
type of use, the type of intellectual property and the identity of the interested party.
If the boundaries of intellectual property are porous and often ill-defined, it
makes the defenses to infringement even more so. Rather than establishing clear
rules as to which uses of copyrighted material are permitted and which are not
(rules that would provide unambiguous and accurate guidance to intellectual
property users), the fair use test sets forth a series of factors that courts are to weigh
5 I. See Joseph P. Liu, Constitutional Challenges to Copyright: Copyright and Breathing Space,
30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429, 435 (2007).

52.
53.

Id. at 434.
This section is drawn from EDUARDO MOISES PE&iALVER AND SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY

OUTLAWS (Yale Press, Forthcoming 2010).
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in determining whether or not a particular use is lawful or infringing. As a
consequence of its judicial malleability, the fair use test offers prospective fair
users precious little guidance in determining how far they can go without crossing
the boundary between lawful fair use and unlawful infringement. The consequence
of this for copyright is that, unlike disobedience in real property which often
involves the violation of clearly established legal norms, for an enormous number
of uses of copyrighted material, it may be genuinely impossible to say ex ante
whether the user is or is not an "outlaw."
Yet the delegation that piracy surveillance facilitates to the ISP through the
DMCA's notice-and-takedown system enables no one but the copyright owner to
make this determination. Given the risk of such pervasive inequality of both power
and access to enforcement, the expansive legal claims of intellectual property
owners have the tendency to take on the force of law, even in the absence of an
objective legal basis for those claims. From the point of view of the intellectual
property consumer or the small-scale creator, disobeying the commands of
entrenched owners can feel just like (and have precisely the same consequences as)
violating a clearly established legal norm.
Admittedly, there can be no question that piracy surveillance has grown much
more sophisticated than in prior years, moving from a reliance on digital "hash"
marks (which could be easily circumvented by changing a file) to more formidable
(and reliable) acoustic or digital fingerprints. Sony and Universal rely heavily, for
54
example, on the use of watermarks that can be traced on peer-to-peer networks.
Especially with respect to video content, however, most surveillance techniques
cannot seem to discern whether the "match" is the result of verbatim infringement,
or whether it is included as a clip in a longer piece. As a result, commentaries (like
Michelle Malkin's piece on the rapper Akon) can be easily mistaken for infringing
55
content without careful human supervision and attention for transformative uses.
Consider the effect of piracy surveillance campaigns on the traditional "grey"
areas of copyright legality-fan fiction, mashup creations and others. 56 Intellectual
property owners regularly troll the internet looking for unauthorized uses of their
content, and they often rely on automated strategies of detection that are overbroad,
generating the risk of erroneous notification. Such monitoring, which often reflects
similar strategies to those undertaken by classic consumer surveillance techniques,
risks chilling either the creation or distribution of such content, even when
individuals might have credible claims of fair use. 57 Although the DMCA does
54. David Kravets, Analysis: FCC Comcast Order is Open Invitation to Internet Filtering,
WIRED, http:/Iblog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/08/analysis-fcc-co.html.
55. Fred Von Lohmann, YouTube's Copyright Filter: New Hurdlefor Fair Use?, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Oct. 15, 2007, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2007/l 0/youtubes-copyright-filternew-hurdle-fair-use.
56.
See Sonia K. Katyal, Performance,Property, and the Slashing of Gender in Fan Fiction, 14 J.

OF GENDER, SOC. POL'Y, & L. 463 (2006).
57. The RIAA maintains a team of Internet specialists and an automated 24-hour web-crawler, a
"bot" that continually crawls through the Internet to identify allegedly infringing activities. Once it
locates the song, it notifies the ISP to terminate the person's online connection until she removes the
offensive copy. The RIAA's software robot, dubbed Copyright Agent, has served millions of copyright
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have a counter-notification process that allows a person to challenge the
determination of infringement and restore access to the material, evidence suggests
that most individuals fail to counter-notify even when they might have valid
defenses. 58 As a result, significant fair use problems plague piracy surveillance
techniques, because they can easily mistake legitimate files for copyrighted
works. 59 Consider the following:
"

In May 2003, the Recording Industry sent a notice to Penn State
University after one of its "bots" detected an MP3 with the name "Usher"
on the title. 60 The RIAA alleged that someone in the astronomy and
astrophysics department had illegally uploaded songs by the artist for free
distribution. However, they were sorely mistaken: it turns out that a
member of the department's faculty, Professor Usher, had uploaded an a
cappella mp3. Although the RIAA took responsibility for the mistake, it
also admitted that it had sent out dozens of mistaken notices in the past,
and at times, did not always fully confirm a suspected case of
61
infringement.

*

In another widely reported case, the RLAA accused a sixty-six year old
retired school teacher of downloading "I'm a Thug" by hip hop artist Trick
Daddy, despite the fact that the woman's computer,
a Mac, could not even
62
host the alleged file-sharing program Kazaa.

*

A DMCA notice was generated after a "bot" detected a Prince song on
YouTube, prompting a takedown. The video was a 29 second
clip of a
63
mother's infant son dancing to Prince's "Let's Go Crazy."

violation notices to ISPs on behalf of hundreds of song writers and performers. See Katyal, at supra
notes 16 and 17. Similar technologies are used by the Motion Picture Association of America, the
Business Software Alliance, and the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers. Robert
G, Gibbons & Lisa M. Ferri, The Legal War Against Cyberspace Privacy, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1999, at 1.
58.
See Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First
Amendment, supra note 12 at 1003. In the first empirical study of 512 notices, Jennifer Urban and Laura

Quilter's findings suggest that 30% of 512 notices asserted copyright infringement where the notice
raised "significant questions related to the underlying copyright claim, including fair use defenses, other
substantive defenses, very thin copyright, or non-copyrightable subject matter." Jennifer M. Urban &
Laura Quilter, Efficient Process of "'ChillingEffects "? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the
Digital Millennium CopyrightAct, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 667 (2006).
59. See Piracy of IntellectualPropertyon Peer-to-PeerNetworks: HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, 107th Cong. 23 (2002) (statement of Gigi B. Sohn,

President, Public Knowledge).
60. See Christina M. Mulligan, Perfect Enforcement of Law: When to Limit and When to Use
Technology, 14 RICH J.L. & TECH. 13, 34 (2008), http:l/law.richmond.edu/joltlvl4i4/articlel3.pdf;
Urban & Quilter, supranote 58.

61.
62.
63.
2009).

Mulligan, supra note 60, at 34.
Id. at 35.
See EFF.org, Lenz v. Universal, http://www.eff.org/cases/lenz-v-universal (last visited Apr. 3,
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*

In an even more dramatic case, media giant Viacom threatened a satirical
parody of comedian Stephen Colbert that was created by Moveon.org.
Entitled "Stop the Falsiness," it included clips from the show, as well as
interviews about Colbert. 64 Although Viacom at first denied sending the
notice, it eventually admitted its error and took a number of positive steps
towards safeguarding fair use. These steps included
setting up a hotline
65
and web site to review complaints from its notices.

"

In another case, an eight-second clip used in a thirteen minute video was
66
taken down by YouTube.

*

Warner Brothers, owner of the copyright to "Harry Potter and the
Sorcerer's Stone," sent a notice to ISP UUNet asking it to disable a user's
internet access because' 67of a single (allegedly infringing file) titled "harry
potter book report.rtf.

"

The Business Software Alliance targeted a company who used a software
named "Open Office," sending it a false form notice that it was making
copies of Microsoft Office available simply
because its "bot" detected the
68
use of the word "office" in the program.

It is true that some major content providers are careful to use a variety of means
to protect fair use, including: (1) manual review of potential takedown targets; (2)
training of reviewers to understand what may constitute fair use; and (3) claiming
to avoid takedown notices for works that are "creative, newsworthy or
transformative" or limited excerpts. 69 But as the examples above establish, no
system of filters is ever foolproof, and the risk of chilling legitimate expression is
highly pronounced in such a system of piracy detection that relies so heavily on
automation.
Given the reach of piracy surveillance strategies, there is also a significant risk
that internet intermediaries, particularly service providers, will increasingly be
asked to play visible and powerful roles as "proxy censors," as Seth Kreimer has
termed their new role. 70 However, enabling a copyright owner to determine what
64. See EFF.org, MoveOn, Brave New Films v. Viacom, http://www.eff.org/cases/moveon-bravenew-films-v-viacom (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
65. Id.
66. See EFF.org, Sapient v. Geller, http://www.eff.org/cases/sapient-v-geller (last visited Apr. 3,
2009).
67.

See Piracy of Intellectual Property on Peer-to-PeerNetworks: HearingBefore the Subcomm.

on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, 107th Cong. 29 (2002) (statement of Gigi B. Sohn,
President, Public Knowledge).
68. See Posting of Declan McCullagh, declan@well.com, to politech@politechbot.com (Feb. 28,
2003) (available at http://www.politechbot.com/p-045 11 .html).
69. See EFF.org, MoveOn, Brave New Films v. Viacom, supra note 64 (describing Viacom's
practices).
70. See Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The FirstAmendment, Internet Intermediaries,
and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11 (2006).
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counts as fair use raises the important question of whether the DMCA should be
delegating such a delicate responsibility to the party who may have a powerful
motivation to censor the material. After all, copyright owners have the strongest
incentives to claim copyright infringement, particularly in cases where they might
prefer to censor or silence threatening or critical speech. For example, when Savitri
Durkee, a city activist, created a web site parody of New York City's Union Square
Partnership (a private group that supports redevelopment of the neighborhood), the
71
Partnership sent a DMCA notice alleging that her parody infringed its copyright.
(The case eventually settled, but not before Durkee was forced to contact the
Electronic Frontier Foundation for a defense). In another case, an organization
posted videos exposing nearly two dozen incidents of animal cruelty at rodeos;
YouTube promptly took down the videos and even cancelled the animal advocates'
registration, even though the alleged copyright owner (the Professional Rodeo
Cowboys Association) did not own a copyright in the taping of the live rodeo
events. 72 Other DMCA notices have been generated for blocking trademark uses
instead of copyright uses. 73 And, in many of those cases, claims of copyright
infringement might never have made it to court because of their weak merits.
However, the DMCA notice and takedown system creates a world that incentivizes
ISPs to respond by taking down material almost immediately, even in hard cases,
and largely without any substantive judicial oversight or intervention.
Given the array of issues that arise with a DMCA notice-and-takedown regime
that delegates responsibility to copyright owners, it is also important to note that
ISPs are also saddled with their own host of concerns regarding their roles in
safeguarding against piracy. Some ISPs, for example, have opted for even more
restrictive controls over their networks by prohibiting certain types of peer-to-peer
software, and are substantially aided in this effort by piracy surveillance
techniques. To the extent that doctrines like network neutrality operate as
safeguards for the freedom of expression, the chilling effect that is raised by these
may raise deeper structural concerns about the open nature of the internet.
Consider Audible Magic's position, favoring a high degree of delegation to the
network owner to determine the boundaries of allowable uses:
We feel strongly that network owners have the right to dictate how their networks are
used. If a network owner chooses to create a policy that no copyright [sic] works may
to use technology to
be transferred over their networks, then they should be free
74
enforce those policies. That is where Audible Magic fits in.
This reasoning has been increasingly challenged recently, culminating in a
powerfully worded FCC decision which ordered Comcast to stop throttling traffic
71.
See EFF.org, USP v. Durkee. http://www.eff.org/cases/usp-v-durkee (last visited Apr. 3,
2009).
72. See EFF.org, SHARK v. PRCA, http://www.eff.org/cases/shark-v-prca (last visited Apr. 3,
2009).
73. See EFF.org, Jones Day v. Blockshopper, http://www.eff.org/cases/jones-day-v-blockshopper
(last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
74. Letter from Audible Magic to a subscriber (July 15, 2004) (available at
http://w2.eff.org/share/audible-magic.php?f-audible magic letter.html).

2009]

FILTERING, PIRACY SURVEILLANCE, AND DISOBEDIENCE

via BitTorrent, a popular peer to peer service. The decision found that Comcast
violated rules against net neutrality when it blocked file transfers from BitTorrent:
We also note that because "consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet
content of their choice," providers, consistent with federal policy, may block
transmissions of illegal content (e.g. child pornography) or transmissions that violate
copyright law. To the extent, however, that providers choose to utilize practices that
are not application or content neutral, the risk to the open nature of the Internet is
particularly acute and the danger of75network management practices being used to
further anticompetitive ends is strong.

Further explanation was provided by Chairman Kevin Martin, who explained
that in determining whether a carrier violated principles of net neutrality,
[The FCC considers] whether the network management practice is intended to
distinguish between legal and illegal activity. The Commission's network principles
only recognize and protect user's access to legal content. The sharing of illegal
content, such as child pornography or content
that does not have the appropriate
76
copyright, is not protected by our principles.
While the FCC's intent to preserve the openness of the Internet is admirable, the
presumption that a carrier can easily distinguish between legal and illegal uses of
copyrighted content is largely overstated. This distinction is fraught with difficulty,
particularly in an age that relies so heavily on appropriating and remixing works.
Finally, an overinclusive approach to piracy surveillance risks not only chilling
some forms of valuable speech, but it also risks having a deleterious effect on the
technologies that distribute content as well, making it even more costly for new
technologies to develop unless they devote substantial resources to the perfection of
such strategies. One is reminded by Professor Lawrence Lessig's observations
regarding the "zero tolerance" of infringement standard, set forth by the district
court in the Napster case so long ago:
If 99.4 percent [compliance with copyright protection] is not good enough, then this is
a war on file-sharing technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no
way to assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance with the
law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of the VCRs or 100
percent of Xerox machines ... are used in compliance with the law ....

The court's

ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of p2p, even for the totally
legal and beneficial uses they77 serve, simply to assure that there are zero copyright
infringements caused by p2p.
Perfect enforcement of copyright, as Lessig suggests, will hamper the
development of distributive technologies by setting forth a standard that may be
75, See Posting of David Kravets to Threat Level, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/
2008/08/analysis-fcc-co.html (Aug. 20, 2008) (quoting Free Press and Public Knowledge, 23 F.C.C.
Rec. 13028, 13058 (2008)).

76.

See id. at 13073.

77. Hannibal Travis, Opting Out of the Internet in the United States and the European Union:
Copyright, Safe Harbors, and InternationalLaw, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 331, 357 (2008) (quoting
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 177 (2006)).
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difficult to comply with over time.
III. RETHINKING THE COPYRIGHT OUTLAW
Piracy surveillance techniques thus suggest an increasing tendency towards the
"perfection" of copyright enforcement strategies. 78 However, outside of the
copyright realm, it is important to note that the law has never really developed with
the goal of perfect and total deterrence in mind.79 Instead, most types of
enforcement involve a mode that allows for some discretion, either on the part of
the law enforcer (prosecution or police) or the putative plaintiff.80 In the context of
copyright, however, we see a disparate set of strategies. One set, seemingly
favored by the recording and movie industry seems to favor strategies of copyright
enforcement that aim towards perfection, and thus risk being overbroad, like
filtering and digital rights management. At the same time, another set of strategies
involves the tendency of copyright owners to tolerate certain uses that might
otherwise constitute infringement, as described eloquently by Tim Wu. 8 Yet the
confluence of these trends-overbroad piracy surveillance, coupled with tolerated
uses-suggests a continuing degree of uncertainty. The result is a pervasive divide
between what the law requires, and what the market tolerates, leaving consumers
open to an unpredictable interpretation of their activities, and an even deeper
vulnerability than the DMCA intended.
In the past two years, however, despite the outcome of cases like Grokster,
which have expanded the legal boundaries of secondary liability, the role of private
industry has attempted to answer questions left unanswered by the DMCA by
favoring an emerging trend towards industry self-regulation. As a result, just as the
law has expanded the general boundaries of secondary liability, more and more
copyright owners are also pulling back on aggressive strategies of copyright
enforcement, and instead are refining partnerships with ISPs instead.
Consider the RIAA's strategy as one example of this trend. For the last several
years, the music industry has crafted a response that offered a unique coupling of
direct enforcement through litigation against end users with public education. The
industry filed suits against peer-to-peer operators (along with tens of thousands of
their subscribers), and undertook a massive educational campaign to largely
convince the public that a significant number of the activities they previously
enjoyed were actually illegal. This campaign prompted a number of trade and
public interest groups to82criticize their efforts as overly simplistic given copyright's
substantial complexity.
Consider, for example, the recording industry's "back to school" anti-piracy
78.
79.

See Mulligan, supra note 60, at 7.
See id.

80.

See id.

81. There is some evidence that content providers choose to avoid blocking uploads of "tiny
amounts" of content or "mashups." See, Media Companies Can Make Content Free-With Respectful
Talks, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Oct. 9, 2008 (availableat 2008 WLNR 19571201).
82. See Greg Sandoval, RIAA Copyright Education Contradictory, Critics Say, CNET NEWS,

Aug. 30, 2006, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1027_3-6111118.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2009).
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educational campaign in 2006, which was sent free of charge to hundreds of
schools. The seven-minute video offered an incredibly simplistic rendition of
copyright's complexities-the video narrator made observations such as "Making
copies for your friends, or giving it to them to copy, or e-mailing it to anyone is just
as illegal as free downloading." 83 The campaign was resoundingly criticized by a
number of trade and public interest associations as "inaccurate, self-contradictory,
and a disservice and embarrassment to the respectable institutions that RIAA has
enlisted. '84 Consider one advocate from the Electronic Frontier Foundation's
response:
They claim that making any copies of any music for friends is "just as illegal as
downloading." Presumably, this includes making a mixed CD for a girlfriend or
buddy - something most people consider to he fair use. It's exactly these kinds of
extreme positions
that make the RIAA look ridiculous and out of touch with today's
85
music fans.
While the campaign did note an allowance for scholarly uses, it makes almost no
mention of the law's allowance for home recordings, something that Sony plainly
86
permits.
Eventually, the RIAA's aggressive position against end users-lawsuits,
monitoring, threats, and expensive settlements-prompted a variety of educational
institutions to double back on their attempts to cooperate with the RIAA, arguing
that valuable staff time had become overloaded with "copyright takedown notices,
'pre-litigation settlement letters,' RIAA-issued subpoenas, lobbying efforts, and
panicked students accused of piracy." 87 After a variety of schools noticed a serious
rise in the number of DMCA notices in 2007, they became even more concerned
with overloading precious staff hours to address the industry's concerns. And then,
finally, a few schools began to explore the option of resisting the RIAA
altogether-either by erasing network logs, challenging subpoenas or by plainly
refusing to forward settlement letters. 88 Even more significant was a growing
concern among academic institutions that the recording industry was attempting to
pressure Congress to obtain legislative rules that compromised the values
of
89
academic openness and privacy that the institutions had attempted to protect.
In the last few months of 2008, facing these challenges, the RIAA ultimately
took the unusual step of ending its relentless campaign of lawsuits against
infringers (35,000 in all) and announcing a decision to emphasize working with

83. Christopher Dawson, RIAA Video for Students if Full of Lies, ZDNet.com,
http://education.zdnet.com/?p-458.
84. Mark Hefflinger, CEA, Public Knowledge Deride RIAA Copyright Education Campaign,
DIGITAL MEDIA WIRE, Aug. 31, 2006, http://www.dmwmedia.com/news/2006/09/01/cea-publicknowledge-deride-riaa-copyright-education-campaign.
85.
Dawson, supra note 83.
86.
See id.
87.
Catherine Rampell, Antipiracy Campaign Exasperates Colleges, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUCATION, Aug. 15, 2008, http://chronicle.com/free/v54/i49/49aoOl04.htm.
88.
See id

89.

See id
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ISPs directly to identify and contact infringers instead. 90 Executives from the
industry explained that the decision was precipitated by a recognition that the
amount of piracy had not decreased enough to justify the costs of the suits, and (in
the words of one executive): "[e]verybody realized this was making us the most
hated industry since the tobacco industry." 9 1 Consequently, the industry opted to
end its lawsuit campaign and instead simply notify the ISP directly if the RIAA
detects infringement. The ISP, in turn, has the responsibility to notify the user, and
92
if the infringement continues, terminate the user's access.
The key difference between the previous strategy and the new one involves a
simple, but important difference: protection of the user's identity. Previously, the
RIAA's strategy was to file lawsuits in order to compel the ISP to reveal the
identity of the alleged infringer. Under the new regime, however, the identity of
the actual infringer is held by the ISP alone, and not disclosed to the RIAA. While
the RIAA reserves the right to sue in a few egregious cases, the responsibility for
93
managing and terminating the user's access rests solely with the ISP instead.
This shift marks an important step in the protection of user privacy, but it also
signals a dramatic delegation to the ISP to enforce the boundaries of copyright
protection. In the past, piracy surveillance techniques included a variety of
mechanisms including monitoring, management and direct interference with
copyright infringement online. 94 All of these strategies relied on the copyright
owner, rather than the ISP, to detect infringement. And, as many examples above
95
have suggested, these modes of detection have often been fraught with mistakes.
In one case, the industry attempted to file suit against a deceased woman who
allegedly "hated computers" until she passed away at age 83.96
Yet the RIAA's decision to partner with ISPs tracks a growing trend towards
industry self-regulation, also favored by the video content industry, which had
recently announced its own partnerships with ISPs. In October of 2007, after much
discussion, a variety of prominent media companies and service providers--CBS,
DailyMotion, Fox Entertainment Group, Microsoft, MySpace, NBC, Veoh and
97
Viacom announced a series of "Principles for User Generated Content Services."
The principles aim to both foster creativity and respect copyright law, and made a
number of powerful observations, among them that "[d]istributors of copyrightinfringing content stifle both technological innovation and artistic creation in ways
90.
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19, 2008, at B1.
93. Id.
94. See Katyal, supra note, 16 at 229.
95.

JR Raphael, RIAA's New Piracy Plan Poses a New Set of Problems, PCWORLD, Dec. 19,
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97. Principles for User Generated Content Services, www.ugcprinciples.com/press_ releases.html
(hereinafter "UGC Principles").
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98
that ultimately will hurt the consumer and hinder the digital economy."
Consequently, the Principles were developed with a variety of objectives in mind:
(1) to eliminate infringing content; (2) to encourage uploads of "wholly original
and authorized user-generated audio and video content;" (3) to accommodate fair
use; and (4) to protect user privacy. 99 The stated ultimate goal is to utilize filtering
block infringing uploads
regimes and identification technologies that eventually
00
"before they are made available to the public."'
At first glance, the partnership's ability to reconcile these divergent interests is
certainly impressive. The partnership works as follows: the copyright owner
provides information (reference data on the content it wants protected-video,
music, etc.-and instructions on how matches should be treated) to the ISP. If a
user uploads content that matches the protected content, then the ISP is authorized
to use the identification technology to block the upload entirely. Or, alternatively,
the copyright owner can also specify that it does not want its content to be blocked,
perhaps due to a preference for licensing or for allowing the content to be
uploaded. 1° 1 If the ISP adheres to the Principles in good faith, the copyright
owners agree that it will not mount a copyright claim against the provider alleging
contributory liability.
For the most part, industry self-regulation appears to be significantly more
dynamic than either the common law or the DMCA, both of which have developed
governing principles on a much slower basis. There are a variety of benefits to
industry self-regulation, in the form of lower transaction costs, a greater knowledge
of technological limitations in the implementation of filters and in the ability to
develop "best practices" that take into account a variety of divergent perspectives
between the two sides through compromise. 10 2 At the same time, however,
industry self-regulation, like much of the notice and takedown system itself, relies
on a copyright owner's determination of what infringement comprises, and thus
tends to overlook the very uncertainties that the law's flexible fair use standard
attempts to protect. As Pamela Samuelson and Jason Schultz have observed, the
content industry has long argued against a formation of consumers "rights" to fair
use or personal copying for noncommercial purposes, tending instead to relegate
can be managed by a reliance on digital rights
these as "expectations" that
103
management in any event.

98.
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See id.
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IN BRIEF 243 (Feb. 2007) (available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2008/02/ 18/rothman.
pdf).
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Moreover, despite the Principles' stated commitment to user privacy and fair
use, the parties' agreement failed to really secure its preservation. For example, the
Principles called for a manual review of content that suggested fair use
implications, but only at the "option" or "inaddition" to the use of identification
technology:
UGC Services may, at their option, utilize manual (human) review of all useruploaded audio and video content in lieu of, or in addition to, use of Identification
Technology, if feasible and if such review is as effective as Identification Technology
in achieving the goal of eliminating infringing content. If a UGC Service utilizes such
manual review, it should do so without regard to whether it has any licensing or other
business relationship with the Copyright Owners. Copyright Owners and UGC
Services should cooperate to ensure that such manual review is implemented in a
manner that effectively balances legitimate interests in (1) blocking infringing useruploaded content, (2) allowing wholly original and authorized uploads, and (3)
accommodating fair use. 104
In response, EFF issued its own series of principles, largely focused on the
preservation of fair use, noting that "a commitment to accommodating 'fair use'
alone is not enough."' 10 5 It argued, instead, for a more general standard that set
forth clearer guidelines, explaining that both creators and copyright owners would
benefit from a clearer and objectively ascertainable standard. 10 6 As a result, the
EFF standard calls for filtering technologies that incorporate fair use protections
within them. It called for a "three strikes before blocking" rule that required a
match between (1) audio, and (2) video and also required (3) that nearly 90% of the
challenged content was composed of a single copyrighted work. The EFF
standards also called for the creator to be able to challenge an automated match,
enabling the "user" to dispute the findings of the filtering process. 107 It also asked
for ISPs to provide more information to the user, including the entire takedown
notice and the rights of the user under the DMCA. Finally, it asked for the creation
of a hotline to request reconsideration of a takedown.
Importantly, both Google and YouTube were absent from the UGC principle
discussions, and YouTube announced its own VideolD technology just a few days
before the UGC principles went public. 10 8 This effort was probably an indirect
response to the lawsuit it faced from Viacom, where the court must determine
whether YouTube had the right and ability to control infringement, or whether it
derived a financial benefit from the infringing activity.' 0 9 In another lawsuit
104. See UGC Principles, supra note 97, at para. 3(0.
105. See EFF.org, Fair Use
Principles
for User Generated
Video
Content,
http://www.eff.org/issues/ip-and-free-speech/fair-use-principles-usergen.
106. Id.
107. Most notably, the EFF called for a precise, granular interpretation of the DMCA putback
procedures--(i) the right to sue if the removal is the result of a knowing material misrepresentation, and
(2) the counter-notice and putback provision that overrides a takedown unless the copyright owner files
an action in court. See Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content, supranote 105.
108. See Meyers, supra note 99, at 946.
109. For more information, including the filings in the case, see http://news.justia.com/
cases/featured/new-york/nysdce/1:2007cv02103/302164/ (last visited June 25, 2009).
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involving user generated video sharing, however, the Veoh case, a court found that
a service provider's inability to control posted content, along with other facts
suggesting a lack of control, served to qualify Veoh for safe harbor protection
under the DMCA, absolving the potential for contributory liability. 110 The
outcome of such a case plainly suggests that YouTube's scope of liability may very
well rest on whether or not a court reaches similar factual determinations. After the
Veoh decision was announced, for example, YouTube counsel Zahavah Levine
stated, "It is great to see the Court confirm that the DMCA protects services like
YouTube that follow the law and respect copyrights ... YouTube has gone above
and beyond the law to protect content owners while empowering people to
'
In response, Viacom retorted,
communicate and share their experiences online."111
in its own statement:
Even if the Veoh decision were to be considered by other courts, that case does
nothing to change the fact that YouTube is a business built on infringement that has
failed to take reasonable measures to respect the rights of creators and content owners.
Google and YouTube have engaged in massive copyright infringement-conduct that
is not protected by any law, including the DMCA.
Nevertheless, YouTube's approach, while buoyed perhaps by the outcome of
cases like Veoh, appears to be ready and willing to take a greater role in policing
posted content. In response to its own lawsuit, YouTube assured the public that it
"hopes to be able to block pirated uploads before they post at all."'1 13 Towards that
end, it utilizes a system called VideolD, which enables a copyright owner to either
block the clip, leave it up or enable YouTube to "monetize" the clip by selling ad
revenue, which it then splits with the copyright owner. 114 When VideolD locates a
match, it draws upon one of three usage policies: Block, Track or Monetize. If a
rights owner specifies a Block policy, the video will not be viewable on YouTube.
If the rights owner specifies a Track policy, the video will continue to be made
available on YouTube and the rights owner will receive information about the
video, such as how many views it receives. For a Monetize policy, the video will
continue to be available on YouTube and ads will appear in conjunction with the
video. The policies can be region-specific, so a content owner can allow11a5
particular piece of material in one country and block the material in another.
110. For more information on the Veoh case and its filings, see Rafat Ali, Veoh Wins Copyright
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpNext?,
at
Lawsuit;
Viacom-YouTube
In/ringement
dyn/content/article/2008/08/28/AR2008082800217.html (last visited June 25, 2009).
111. See id., quoting Levine.
112. Seeid.
113. Rob Hof, YouTube Intros VideolD System; Will Studios Go Along?, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Oct.
15, 2007 (available at http://www.businessweek.con/thethread/techbeat/archives/2007/10/youtube
_intros.html).
114. See Greg Sandoval, YouTube's Filters Help Copyright Owners Profit From Pirated Videos,
CNET.com, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10027509-93.html.
115. See YouTube Copyright Policy: Video Identification Tool, http://www.google.com/support/
youtube/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=83766. For commentary on this policy, see Tony Bates, The
Perils of YouTube Filtering:Parts I and I, The MTTLR Blog, http://blog.mttlr.org/2007/12/perils-ofyoutube-filtering.html.
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Google has stated that most copyright owners choose to leave the clips up 90
percent of the time. 116 Some predict that technology will develop that will search
117
for unauthorized videos and automatically insert advertisements into the clips.
In a study completed for ZDNet of Google's filters for YouTube, the authors
concluded that filters catch illegally uploaded content (using a "Saturday Night
118
Live" clip from NBC), roughly 75 to 80 percent of the time.
These strategies have been heralded as win-win outcomes for both the consumer
and the copyright owner. As one advocate observes, "[p]irates look less like
scoundrels and more like ambassadors as they share their favorite content and
evangelize on behalf of the owner." 119 Yet no guideline principles regarding
transparency-how the content is selected, for example-are established so that
users can modify their activities; "We don't want people to steer around (the
technology)," Zahavah Levine, YouTube's chief counsel, explained.1 20 In fact, one
recent study suggested that YouTube's audio fingerprinting process, while seeming
121
incredibly broad and comprehensive, was also prone to some mistakes.
Moreover, although the monetization process theoretically sounds very strong in
terms of offering a clear compromise between copyright owner and consumer, the
statistics on whether this outcome is more preferable than the others have yet to be
empirically verified. 122 And Viacom, while reluctantly congratulating YouTube on
"stepping up its responsibility and ending the practice of profiting from copyright
infringement," has not yet altered its lawsuit to addressing acts of past
infringement. 123
The confluence of piracy surveillance strategies, with the increased prominence
of industry self-regulation brings us to a curious moment in copyright history. We
are still unsure of where the responsibility should lie for detecting infringement
online-should it lie with the copyright owner, an Intemet Service Provider, or
some other administrative outlet instead? And how does one ensure due process
and transparency in efforts to self-regulate? In the end, the presence of a filtering
option, coupled with the increasingly laudatory responses that surround
monetization, suggests that market resolution of these principles may overshadow
any claims to copyright law's granular ability to govem what is legal and what is
not. Further, even aside from the risk of chilling both expression and innovation,
116. See Sandoval, supra note 114; see also Making Money on YouTube with Content ID,
OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/08/making-money-on-youtube-with-

content-id.html.
117. See Sandoval, supra note 114.
118. See Tom Steinert-Threlkeld, YouTube's Video System:

Is 75 Percent Accuracy Good

Enough?, ZDNET UNDERCOVER, at 3 (Nov. 2008).

119. David Samo, Waltzing Around the Piracy Issue, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2008, at El.
120. Scott Kirsner, YouTube's New Tools Axe Illicit Video, VARIETY, Oct. 15, 2007, available at
http://www.variety.com/article/VRl 117974071 .html?categoryid=1009&cs=l.
121. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Testing YouTube's Audio Content ID System, at
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/04/testing-youtubes-aud.
122. See Sarno, supra note 119. Yet Time Warner and the News Corporation, NBC Universal and
Walt Disney have not yet signed on to the cause. See also Brian Selter, Now Playing on YouTube: Clips
with Ads on the Side, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 16, 2008, at C1.
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the more unsettled issue continues to be the degree of delegation that the DMCA
should extend to a copyright holder in determining the boundaries of legality.
Consider Google's own observation:
Now, when it comes to spotting pornography and graphic violence, and other content
prohibited by our terms of use, nothing beats our community flagging. Once a user
flags a video, we immediately review it and remove it if we find a violation. But our
community can't identify infringing content. We all know pornography and violence
when we see them. But copyright status can only be determined by the copyright
holder. That is because almost anyone who creates an original video has the copyright

for that work, and such a wide range of copyright holders' preferences vary widely. 24
Google's observation suggests the need for an almost wholesale delegation to
the copyright holder in determining the boundaries of legality. Given the strong
incentives that operate in favor of using ISPs as proxy censors, the law should be
careful about encouraging further delegation as it takes up these issues in the future.
CONCLUSION
We are at a moment of important ambiguity in the balance between copyright
enforcement and civil liberties. For the past several years, we have seen a barrage
of headlines predicting regarding the fall of the music industry due to digital piracy.
Today, as we watch the industry shift to accommodate new models for content
distribution, we also see the growth of less prominent and invasive forms of
surveillance, filtering and monitoring to guard against potential piracy.
While other scholars in this Symposium have performed masterful analyses of
the various statutory tensions that arise from these regulations in terms of the
question of vicarious and contributory liability, I have suggested, more broadly,
that the DMCA's provisions, in light of common law developments, have affected
the granularity and significance of classic civil liberties-privacy, freedom of
speech and fair use-in relation to the protection of digital intellectual property. In
the past, the preexisting balance between intellectual property and civil liberties coexisted, mostly due to the panoply of different laws and principles-constitutional,
124. See Steve Chen, Youtube Co-Founder, The State of Our Video ID Tools, OFFICIAL GOOGLE
BLOG http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2007/06/state-of-our-video-id-tools.html. The blog continues:
Some copyright holders want control over every use of their creation. Many professional artists
and media companies post their latest videos without telling us, while some home video-makers
don't want their stuff online. Some legal departments take down a video one day and the
marketing department puts it up the next. Which is their right, but our community can't predict
those things, and neither can we. The same is true for technology. No matter how good our video
identification technology gets, it will never be able to read copyright-holders' minds.
If a content owner identifies material that she doesn't want on YouTube, she can request its
removal with the click of a mouse. If particular users repeatedly infringe copyrights, we
terminate their accounts. We have long made a practice of creating a unique "hash" of every
video removed for alleged copyright infringement and blocking re-uploads of the hash. We
educate users on what is and isn't permissible under the law. Our upcoming video identification
system will be our latest way of empowering copyright holders, going above and beyond legal
requirements.
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statutory, common law-governing each interest. Yet an emerging conflict in these
areas regarding the role of intermediaries poses a number of interesting
philosophical and practical problems, particularly where the role of intellectual
property is concerned. Consequently, shifts in the market, as well as shifts in
technology, suggest the need for a more precise balance maintained by constant
supervision.

